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Abstract. Encryption is an effective way to protect sensitive data in a database 
from various attacks. Querying encrypted data, however, becomes a challenge. 
Either the data should be decrypted before the querying, leaving it vulnerable to 
server-side attacks, or one has to apply computationally expensive methods for 
querying encrypted data. In this paper, we present a flexible mechanism for the 
execution of queries over encrypted graph databases. Data privacy is protected 
at the server side, through the use of multi-layered encryption and encryption 
layer adjustment, conducted dynamically during the execution of queries. The 
proposed scheme reveals less information to the adversary than in the case of 
static adjustment done prior to execution. We report on the implementation of 
the scheme as applied to a subset of Cypher graph queries (graph traversal 
queries) directed at a Neo4j graph database. The experimental results show the 
efficiency of query execution for various types of query on encrypted graph 
data stores. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Database security is attracting considerable interest due to the importance of data that 
is routinely hosted in enterprise databases, the large amounts of found in 
organizations of all sizes, from large corporations to small businesses. The goal of 
database security involves protecting the database from unauthorised or accidental 
access to data, modification or destruction. 
In order to protect data integrity and privacy, data encryption has been used, as an 
active protection mechanism. One of the most challenging and important aspect of 
data encryption is how to query the encrypted data. Starting from the influential work 
of Popa et al. [9] a lot of research has been conducted in the field of querying 
encrypted database, avoiding full data decryption. Using multi-layered encryption and 
appropriate encryption adjustment procedures is the key to finding the right balance 
between security and query execution performance. 
In this paper we present different mechanisms for adjusting encryption layers in 
the context of graph databases [11]. In order to provide a reasonable trade-off between 
data security protection and data processing efficiency CryptGraphDB [3] utilizes 
multi-layered encryption and encryption adjustment, inspired by the CryptDB system 
for relational DBs [9]. The graph query is translated into an encrypted form before 
 
 
 
processing. The encryption layers of the data are adjusted accordingly at the server 
side. Subsequently, the query is executed on a server and the encrypted results are 
sent back to a user where they are finally decrypted. In both, CryptDB and 
CryptGraphDB approaches various types of encryption are used, organized as 
encryption onion layers. Notice that in all mentioned works and in this paper only the 
variants of symmetric encryption as opposed to asymmetric (public key) encryption 
are used. 
At the outermost layer highly secure encryption schemes that leak virtually 
nothing about the data are typically used. Most common examples of such encryption 
schemes are random, or randomized (RND) encryption schemes [10], meaning that 
the same plain text values are likely to be translated into different cipher texts under 
same encryption key. To make it possible to execute some queries over encrypted 
data which require, for example, equality checks, the encryption level should be 
adjusted to become a deterministic layer (DET). This allows for equality checking to 
be done, without revealing any more information. The DET layer can be easily 
provided by any deterministic symmetric encryption algorithm (e.g. DES or AES). 
In this paper we elaborate a traversal-aware encryption adjustment mechanism for 
graph databases, first proposed in [2], report on its implementation for a subset of 
Cypher queries (traversal queries) and empirically evaluate its efficiency. The 
proposed mechanism reveals only the information required to execute the query. By 
using this approach, we can observe that not all property values in the graph are 
adjusted with respect to the DET layer, but only required values are adjusted, while 
the rest are still in the RND layer. One of the major drawbacks of the traditional way 
to search an encrypted database is to decrypt all the data to the DET layer, then find 
the required records. Apart from representing a significant security risk, this 
traditional approach is resource intensive particularly when considering a large 
number of records. Our technique shows a clear advantage by dynamically adjusting 
encryption layers as query execution progresses. In this way less information is 
revealed to any adversary watching the execution of the query on the encrypted store; 
while, as demonstrated in the paper, being reasonably efficient. The graph database 
system used to analyse the approach is Neo4j as developed by Neo Technology in 
2007 [14]. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The related work is outlined 
in Section 2. In Section 3 querying of encrypted graph DB, as proposed in [2, 3], is 
presented. Section 4 then explains the implementation of the proposed traversal-aware 
encryption adjustment and case studies. The experiments and analyses of the 
performance of the proposed approach is presented in Section 5. Some conclusions 
and some suggested areas for future work are presented in Section 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 2 Related Work 
 
One of the challenges of querying encrypted databases is revealing unnecessary data 
while performing the adjustment of the encryption layers. In a classical CryptDB 
paper [9], dealing with such an issue for JOIN queries for relational databases, the 
authors introduced a special JOIN-aware encryption mechanism. In [3] a CryptDB-
like approach, referred to as CryptGraphDB, was proposed for graph databases and it 
was particularly noted that due to absence of a JOIN operator in the Cypher graph 
query language, there is no need in use of JOIN-aware encryption; however, the 
problem of unnecessarily revealing information after encryption layer adjustment 
continued to exist. To address this problem, in a position paper [2] a novel scheme of 
traversal-aware encryption adjustment for graph DBs was proposed and theoretically 
discussed, but no implementation, or empirical evaluation was reported. The work on 
structured encryption and controllable disclosure presented in [6] provided an 
interesting alternative to the methods developed in [2, 3, 9] and this paper. In 
particular [6] uses a different cryptographic scheme under which the whole (graph) 
data structure is encrypted, not only the data elements. The latter, unlike the approach 
we present in this paper, could make an implementation of the methods of [6] on the 
top of an existing graph DBMS challenging. The detailed comparison of both 
approaches is a topic of future research. 
 
3 Querying of Encrypted Graph DB: Existing Approach 
 
As noted above, there has been little work on querying encrypted graph databases. The 
only work that the authors are aware of is the work on Graph CryptDB presented in [3] 
and, the work on Traversal-Aware Encryption Adjustment presented in [2]. In both 
cases, the implementation was done with respect to Neo4j graph DBMS and Cypher as 
a query language. Each is discussed in further detail in the following two sub-sections. 
 
3.1 Graph CryptDB 
CryptGraphDB [3] works by executing Cypher queries over an encrypted graph 
database. By translating the query into an encrypted form, executing it over the 
encrypted data on the server without any decryption and sending the results back to 
the user where they can be decrypted. In this way data privacy is protected 
 
 
 
at the server side. At the core of the Graph CryptDB are three ideas espoused by 
CryptDB [9] : (1) a Cypher-aware encryption strategy which maps Cypher queries to 
the encryption schemes; (2) Adjustable query-based encryption that lets 
CryptGraphDB adjust the encryption level of each data item based on the user query; 
and (3) Onion encryption to change data encryption levels in an efficient manner. 
CryptGraphDB is composed of two parts: a trusted client-side frontend, and an 
untrusted DBMS server. The frontend keeps track of the database schema as seen by 
the application without encryption, and the current level of onion encryption exposed 
in the server for each data item. On the other hand, the server keeps track of the 
encrypted schema; the encrypted format of user data (the lowest level of encryption 
revealed to the server). It provides confidentiality for data content and for names of 
labels and properties; also, it does not hide the entire graph structure, the number of 
nodes, or the approximate size of data in bytes. 
Processing a query Q in CryptGraphDB, as shown in Figure 1, involves four 
steps: 
1. The application issues a query, that is rewritten by the proxy by anonymizing 
each label, node and relationship names; and encrypts each constant in the query 
with the most private encryption scheme (RND). 
2. The proxy checks whether the DBMS needs to adjust the encryption level. If so, it 
sends an update query to adjust the encryption level. 
3. The proxy sends the encrypted query to the DBMS server to be executed using a 
standard Cypher and returns the encrypted results. 
4. The DBMS server returns the encrypted query result which are decrypted by the 
proxy and sent back to the application. 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 The typical query flow in Graph CryptDB 
 
 
In [3] the simple encryption adjustment method is proposed. Initially, each value 
in the graph is encrypted using RND, the outermost layer. At the second of the above 
steps checking by the proxy prior to query execution is done using simple syntactical 
criteria. In particular, if a value of some attribute may be required for the query  
  
in a plaintext form, or encrypted at DET level, the corresponding adjustments will be 
done across the whole data store. As was pointed out in [2] this may lead to 
unnecessary information leaks and therefore a more advanced Traversal-Aware 
Encryption Adjustment method for alleviating this issue was proposed in [2] as 
discussed in the following subsection. 
 
An example of query processing with simple encryption adjustment 
Given a query of the form: 
 
MATCH (node:person)-[:knows]->( ) 
WHERE  node.name = {"Tom"} 
RETURN node.age 
 
In order to allow the equality check, this query needs to pass to the DET layer as detailed 
in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Data layout at the server where the application table on the left is created at the server 
from the table on the right. 
 
person person 
  
 
Step (1), Proxy sends to the DBMS: UPDATE person SET name=DECRYPT 
RND(name), DBMS decrypts entire name property to DET layer: 
DECRYPT name, RND(a4a895a87052) = UD82Pv8uGNi7 
Next, Proxy updates its internal state to log that name is currently at layer 
DET in the DBMS. 
Step (2), the proxy encrypts "Tom", to the DET layer encryption value of 
UD82Pv8uGNi7, then, proxy generates query and sends it to DBMS: 
MATCH (node:person)-[:knows]->( ) 
WHERE node.name = {""UD82Pv8uGNi7"} 
RETURN node.age 
Step (3), the proxy receives encrypted RND level result e6ba69bdf08c and decrypts 
it using: DECRYPT age,DET(DECRYPT age,RND(e6ba69bdf08c))= 29. 
Lastly, proxy sends decrypted result 29 to the application. 
 
3.2 Traversal-Aware Encryption Adjustment 
The idea of Traversal-Aware Encryption Adjustment (TAEA) is quite natural and 
simple. During the query execution the paths starting with nodes with specific names 
values and progressing alongside specified relationships are traversed. The execution 
may perform additional checks of some properties of encountered nodes. 
name at RND age at RND name at DET age at DET 
a4a895a87052 e6ba69bdf08c UD82Pv8uGNi7 33TPfYgeYDKb 
9d60b415e6e7 686097aa7a7a j39IjDVyx/+ NMtqlsMp8Qaf 
 
name age 
Tom 29 
Smith 22 
 
 
 
 
So, the adjustment will not be everywhere, but just along the query execution path. 
The scheme of traversal-aware encryption adjustment is dynamic, and the encryption 
adjustment happens not before the query execution, but rather it gradually progresses 
alongside the execution. 
The scheme follows the simple principles defined in [2]: 
 
– Encryption adjustments and traversal query execution are interlaced; 
– The adjustments happen in-between traversal steps; 
– The adjustment is performed to enable one step of traversal using all information 
accumulated to this step, in particular the set of nodes traversed so far. 
 
By considering a simple case study in [2] (an execution of a simple query “on a 
paper”) it was shown that indeed TAEA may reveal less information to a potential 
attacker as compared with simple adjustment. However, the study in [2] was only a 
proof-of-concept study. 
 
4 Towards Implementation of TAEA 
 
In this section we describe an implementation of TAEA for a subset of the Cypher 
queries. We start with simple examples first. In general, an execution of a query with 
TAEA over an encrypted graph data store requires an execution of interlaced partial 
queries and encryption adjustment updates. While it is possible to compose these 
partial queries and updates using the WITH construct of Cypher, and thereby to 
execute all the sequence automatically (in one go), for simplicity, here we present the 
required sequence of separate queries and updates. The composition is discussed later 
in sub-section 5.2. 
 
Query with a single relationship. Consider a query Q consisting of one link and two 
search criteria: 
 
MATCH (node1: label1)-[:Relationship]->(node2: label2) 
WHERE node1.propertyA = {value1} AND 
node2.propertyB = {value2} RETURN node2 
 
The query Q, using the TAEA scheme, is processed, as follows: 
 
1. Each value starts out encrypted with the most private encryption level where data 
is encrypted using the RND scheme. 
2. To check the equality for the first part of the WHERE clause, 
node1.propertyA = value1, we need to lower the encryption of               
propertyA to level DET. The proxy issues this query to the server UPDATE 
Label1 SET propertyA = DECRYPT RND(propertyA), that use the 
DECRYPT RND UDFs, where DECRYPT RND is a user defined function 
implementing decryption which is discussed in sub-section 4.1. 
  
3. Executing the query Q  to allow the initial search node1.propertyA = 
encrypted value1 for nodes of Q to be executed. Here encrypted 
value1 is the encryption of value1, when the path required in the main query 
Q start as: 
 
MATCH (node1:label1)-[:Relationship]->(node2:label2) 
WHERE node1.propertyA = {encrypted value1} 
RETURN node2 AS result 
Where result is used as an alias for the result column name. 
4. Lowering the encryption level of node2.propertyB for nodes that are 
reachable from the outgoing of Q  to DET layer. 
5. Processing the second part of the query Q: 
 
MATCH (node1:label1)-[:Relationship]->(result:label2) 
WHERE result.property2 = {encrypted value2} 
RETURN result 
6. Finally, proxy decrypts the results from the server and returns them to the user. 
 
Query with multiple relationships In the case of having a query Q consisting of 
multiple statements and two search criteria, as follows: 
 
MATCH(node1:label)-[Rel1]->(node2:label)-[Rel2]->(node3:label) 
WHERE node1.propertyA={value1} AND node2.propertyB = {value2} 
AND node3.propertyC = {value3} 
RETURN node3 
Processing a query Q of the above form under TEAE is as follows: 
 
1. Each value in the graph is encrypted using the RND scheme. 
2. According to the first part node1.propertyA=value1 of Q, we need to 
lower the encryption of propertyA to level DET. By using DECRYPT RND UDF: 
UPDATE Label SET propertyA = DECRYPT RND(propertyA). 
3. As Q has multiple links, we start with the first part R  which is (node1)- 
[Rel1]->(node2), and execute the query Q  to allow the initial search 
node1.propertyA=encrypt(value1) for nodes of Q to be executed. 
When the path required in the main query Q start as: 
 
MATCH (node1:label)-[Rel1]->(node2:label)-[Rel2]-
>(node3:label)  
WHERE node1.propertyA = {encrypt(value1)} 
RETURN node2 AS result 
 
Here, result is used as an alias for result column name of Q , while 
encrypt(value1) is the encryption of value1. 
4. In order to implement the second part Q  of Q, we need to lower the encryption 
level of result.propertyB for nodes that have an incoming relationship 
with the result variable of Q  to the DET layer. 
 
 
 
5. Processing the second part Q  of the query Q: 
 
MATCH (result)<-[Rel2]-(node3:label)  
WHERE node3.propertyB = {encrypted value2} 
RETURN result 
 
6. Finally, proxy decrypts the results and sends them back to the user.       
We now consider general case of the simple traversal query of the form: 
MATCH(node1:label_1)-[:Relationship1]->...(node_i:label_i)-
[:Relationship_i]->...(node_k: label_k) 
WHERE node_1.property_1={value1} AND ... node_i.property_i 
= {value_i}... AND node_k.property_k = {value_k} 
RETURN node_k 
 
The following is the process for resolving a query Q of the above form using the 
TEAE scheme: 
 
1. Encrypt all values at RND layer. 
2. Lowering the encryption of property  1 to level DET, by using 
decryptRND UDF: SET property 1 =decryptRND(property 1). 
3. Execute Q  which is the first part of Q when the path required start as: 
MATCH(node_1:label_1)-[:Relationship1]->(node_i:label_i)  
WHERE node_1.property_1 = {encrypt(value1)} 
RETURN node_i AS result 
Here, result is used as an alias for the result column name of Q , while 
encrypt(value1) is the encryption of value1. 
4. In order to execute the second part Q  of Q, we need to lower the encryption level 
of result.property-i for nodes that have an incoming relationship with 
result of Q  to the DET layer. Then, execute Q  as: 
MATCH (result)<-[:Relationship_i]-(node_k:label_k)  
WHERE result.property_i={encrypt(value_i)}  
RETURN result_1 
5. For Q , lower the encryption of property_k for nodes that have an incoming 
relationship with result_1 of Q2 to DET, ... 
6. Finally, proxy decrypts the results and sends them back to the user. 
 
4.1 Implementation 
We implemented a prototype system for evaluating the performance of traversal- 
aware encryption adjustment. To build this prototype, we utilized AES (Advanced 
Encryption Standard) algorithm [1]. For the RND layer we used AES in CBC mode 
with an initialization vector (IV) obtained as the hash of ID of the node to which 
encrypted data belong to. For DET layer we used AES in ECB mode. The security 
parameter of AES key encryption schemes is 128-bit.  
  
We create a set of User-Defined Functions (UDFs) to be called directly from Cypher 
queries [15]. The functions encryptDET, encryptRND, decryptRND, and decryptDET 
implement encryption and decryption for the DET and RND layers, respectively. UDFs 
are written in Java, they are packaged in a Jar-file, deployed into the               
$NEO4J_HOME/plugins, and then can be called in the same way as any other 
Cypher function. 
 
4.2 Case studies 
 
In this sub-section we present several examples of the queries executed on a particular 
graph data store under different encryption adjustment policies using implemented 
UDFs for encryption and decryption. Suppose we have a graph database of Person 
and two properties of interest: name and age, and the relationships KNOWS; the 
scenario is illustrated in Figure 2. Consider the Cypher query as follows: 
 
MATCH (node1:person)-[:KNOWS]->(node2:person) 
WHERE node1.name = "Tom" AND node2.age = "22" 
RETURN node2 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 Example data layout schema at the server of the graph database. 
 
 
For this study, we considered the execution of the above query in three modes: 
(1) non-encrypted; (2) encrypted with simple adjustment; and (3) with traversal- 
aware encryption adjustment. 
 
 
 
Non-encrypted The search criteria WHERE clause has two parameters, starts with 
node1.name = "Tom" when executed gives an output of three nodes 
{Smith,22}, {Smith,35},{Lee,18} to be traversed (these are reached from 
the {Tom,29} node in one step via the KNOWS relation). Next, execute the second 
part of the query node2.age = "22". Lastly, get the {Smith,22} node as the 
final result. 
 
Encrypted with simple adjustment We observe from Figure 2 that the schema of the 
graph database at plain status. Initially, each value in the graph is encrypted within the 
RND layer as the outermost layer, as follows: 
MATCH (n) 
SET n.name = 
encryptRND((encryptDET(n.name)),ID(n)),n.age=encryptRND 
((encryptDET(n.age)),ID(n)) 
 
Where encryptRND and encryptDET are a user defined function 
implementing the encryption as mentioned in sub-section 4.1. Resolution of the query 
requires the lowering of the encryption of name and age to level DET (as we need to 
check the equality). To do so, we need to update the data by using SET clauses: 
MATCH (n) 
SET n.name = decryptRND(n.name,ID(n)) AND 
n.age=decryptRND(n.age,ID(n)) 
Next, the proxy generates a query and sends it to DBMS: 
MATCH (node1:person)-[:KNOWS]->(node2:person) 
WHERE node1.name = "UD82Pv8uGNi7" AND node2.age = 
"NMtqlsMp8Qaf"  
RETURN node2 
 
Where, "UD82Pv8uGNi7" and "NMtqlsMp8Qaf" are the encryption of "Tom" and 
"22", respectively. Lastly, proxy receives the encrypted result 
{j39IjDVyx/+,NMtqlsMp8Qaf}. Proxy sends the decrypted result {Smith,22} 
to the application. 
 
Encrypted using Traversal-Aware Encryption Adjustment We note from Figure 2 
that the graph at plain status. Initially, each value in the database is encrypted with the 
most secure RND layer, as listed in Table 2. The advantage is that the server can learn 
nothing about the data values. 
Returning to resolving the example query Q: 
 
MATCH (node1:person)-[:KNOWS]->(node2:person)  
WHERE node1.name = "Tom" AND node2.age = "22"  
RETURN node2 
 
Subsequently, we need to remove the onion layer, as WHERE node1.name="Tom" 
requires lowering the encryption of name to level DET, the proxy issues the following 
query to the server UPDATE Label SET name = DECRYPT RND(name), 
  
Table 2. Plain text data, encryption at the RND layer and encryption at the DET layer 
(Ciphertexts shown are not full-length). 
 
name age name at RND age at RND name at DET age at DET 
Tom 29 a4a895a87052 e6ba69bdf08c UD82Pv8uGNi7 33TPfYgeYDKb 
Smith 22 9d60b415e6e7 686097aa7a7a j39IjDVyx/+ NMtqlsMp8Qaf 
Tom 39 9b078f653478 21da9938c098 UD82Pv8uGNi7 Ss67Waxq2n+m 
Lee 18 6cf77f7817b1 bcb86ac44437 RQpqwfEE8Kbm fxEYkxe7g+P27L 
Smith 35 e7a86cbc36ff 83e6b8ab0edc j39IjDVyx/+ 5K6xJRUEJ2s+ 
Jones 32 141a99a21cf4 dfd2e8d1dfa2 ax+/5Q23fEl4 z0sfDuU2mIP/ 
Perry 47 ca06d68f7c6b c1051d53aae2 0nPCg1bAxh8R oSLl00rhMbeZ 
Sara 38 a5cb936cd7ed 7ed31f9f083d Z+NQr9J7iSRi V01kYVwG13GU 
Perry 38 c32f8d5d66a1 49521d4f028e 0nPCg1bAxh8R V01kYVwG13GU 
Tom 40 5f2041a58089 56c26c25e4d UD82Pv8uGNi7 rXhFoilgAFoO 
 
 
that use the decryptRND UDFs, where decryptRND is a user defined function 
implementing decryption which is discussed in sub-section 4.1. 
Then we execute the query Q  that process the initial search for nodes where the 
path required to resolve the original query Q may start: 
MATCH (node1:person)-[:KNOWS]->(node2:person) 
WHERE node1.name = "UD82Pv8uGNi7" 
RETURN node2 AS output 
Here the output variable is used as an alias for the result column name of Q , 
and UD82Pv8uGNi7 is the encryption of Tom. As a result of the first stage of the 
query resolution, there are three nodes as the outgoing of the n.name = 
"UD82Pv8uGNi7" node. 
Before processing the second part of the query Q, WHERE y.age = "22", we 
need to lower the encryption level of the age property of nodes in the output 
variable ONLY to the DET layer. 
Then we execute the query Q , implementing the next step of Q execution: 
MATCH (n: person)-[:KNOWS]->(output) 
WHERE output.age = "NMtqlsMp8Qaf" 
RETURN output 
Lastly, Proxy receives the encrypted result of the above implementation 
{j39IjDVyx/+q,NMtqlsMp8Qaf} , decrypts the result and sends the decrypted 
result back {Smith,22} to the application. This solution improves on previous 
methods by not decrypting all age properties at the DET layer, but only decrypting 
what the query resolution requires. 
 
Bounded traversal In order to investigate how the traversal-aware adjustment works 
with a specific variable length path, we return to the database example that is 
presented in Figure 2, a variable length path of between 1 and 3 relationships from 
node1 to node2 is considered below. For example, if we assume a query Q: 
 
 
 
MATCH (node1)-[*1..3]->(node2) 
WHERE node1.name = ’Smith’ AND node2.age = ’38’ 
RETURN node2 
 
At the start point all values are held in the RND layer. We then move values to the 
DET layer using the function UPDATE Label SET P = DECRYPT RND, where 
P corresponds to name. Thereafter, we perform the query Q  processing the initial 
search for nodes when the path required in the original query Q starts as: 
 
MATCH (node1)-[*1..3]->(node2) 
WHERE node1.name = "j39IjDVyx/+" 
RETURN node2 AS output 
 
Again, the output variable is used as an alias for the result column name of Q , 
j39IjDVyx/+ corresponds to the encryption of Smith. Further execution of Q  
shows that there are six nodes as the outgoing of node1.name = 
"j39IjDVyx/+" condition. Before processing the second part of the query Q, 
WHERE node2.age = "38", we need to lower the encryption level of the age 
property of nodes in the output variable to the DET layer. 
Next we execute the query Q , implementing the next step of Q execution: 
 
MATCH (node1)-[*1..3]->(output)  
WHERE output.age = ’V01kYVwG13GU’  
RETURN output 
 
Where V01kYVwG13GU is the encryption of "38". Finally, Proxy receives the 
encrypted result of the above implementation {Z+NQr9J7iSRi,V01kYVwG13GU}, 
and sends the decrypted result {Sara,38} back to the application. 
 
Unbounded traversal Now, we need to see the affect when the path length between 
nodes is unbounded; when the variable path length of any number of relationships 
from node1 to node2 is unlimited. With reference to the example graph in Figure 2, 
assume the following query Q: 
 
MATCH (node1)-[*]->(node2) 
WHERE node1.name = ’Smith’ AND node2.age = ’38’ 
RETURN node2 
 
To resolve the query the DET layer for name is required. We process the query Q  
to allow the initial search for nodes to be executed, when the path required in the 
original query Q starts as: 
 
MATCH (node1)-[*]->(node2) 
WHERE node1.name = "j39IjDVyx/+"  
RETURN node2 AS output 
  
At this stage the output variable is used as an alias for the result column of Q , 
j39IjDVyx/+ corresponds to the encryption of Smith. Further execution of Q  
indicates that there are seven nodes in output using the filter node1.name = 
"j39IjDVyx/+". 
As soon as the lowering of the encryption level of the age property of the nodes in 
the output variable to the DET layer has been done, we can process the second part 
of the query Q, which is WHERE node2.age = "38". Next we execute Q , to 
implement the next step of Q: 
 
MATCH (node1)-[*]->(output) 
WHERE output.age = ’V01kYVwG13GU’ 
RETURN node2 
 
Where V01kYVwG13GU is the encryption of "38". The Proxy receives the 
encrypted results from the previous implementation: 
{Z+NQr9J7iSRi,V01kYVwG13GU} and {0nPCg1bAxh8R,V01kYVwG13GU} 
; and decrypts the results {Sara,38} and {Perry,38} and returns them to the 
user. 
 
5 Experiments and Performance Analysis 
 
In this section we report on the results of experiments conducted to show the validity 
of the approach and estimate the performance. 
 
5.1 Datasets 
In order to study the traversal-aware encryption adjustment concept a variety of 
datasets have been used. A total of five Neo4j databases were constructed (Table 3). 
Each database consists of a number of nodes and edges, and each node has a different 
number of properties, as well as relationships. 
For the case study we consider a particular graph database instance. In this 
example scenario we have nodes with the label Person, and group of properties of 
interest: name, age, and gender. Graph datasets were created to contain approximately 
10, 100, 500, 1000, and 10000 nodes to aid in assessing execution time of queries 
over non-encrypted data and encrypted data. 
The system used for testing ran on Windows, version 10. It has an Intel Core 2 
Duo CPU running at 3.40 GHz and has 16 GB of RAM. The benchmarking program 
was the only application running when the results were created, but the machine was 
connected to the Internet and standard system processes were running. 
 
 
 
5.2 Queries 
To test the approach, we executed the queries Q1 – Q5 below over non-encrypted data 
and over encrypted data using traversal-aware encryption adjustment where 
applicable. We refer to encrypted versions of the queries as Q'1 – Q'5. This particular 
set of queries was selected to test some commonly used in graph databases queries. 
Q1: Find all orphan nodes (no incoming edges and no outgoing edges). 
MATCH (node) 
WHERE not((node)-[ ]-()) 
RETURN node 
Q2: Basic Relationships Matching 
MATCH (node1)-[:KNOWS]->(node2) 
WHERE node1.name = ’Tom’ AND node2.age = ’22’ 
RETURN node2.name, node2.age 
Q3: Adding Relationship Length 
MATCH (node1)-[:KNOWS]->(node2)-[:KNOWS]->(node3) 
WHERE node1.name = ’Jones’ AND node2.age = ’47’ AND 
node3.gender = ’Female’ 
RETURN node3.name, node3.age, node3.gender 
Q4: Variable Relationship Length 
MATCH (node1)-[:KNOWS*1..3]->(node2) 
WHERE node1.name = ’Jones’ AND node2.age = ’38’ 
RETURN node2.name, node2.age 
Q5: Infinite Length and Length Limit 
MATCH (node1)-[:KNOWS*]->(node2) 
WHERE node1.name = ’Jones’ AND node2.age = ’38’ 
RETURN node2.name, node2.age 
 
Notice that execution of each of Q'2 – Q'5, requires the execution of several 
queries/updates (unlike the single query execution of non-encrypted versions). In 
order to make a fair comparison we composed query/update parts of Q'i by using 
WITH clauses. Having WITH enabled the query parts to be chained together, passing 
the outputs from one to be used as starting points or criteria in the next. As in these 
queries the first condition is WHERE node1.name=’value’ we need to adjust the 
encryption level of name to the DET layer to allow equality checking. Take for 
example, Q'2, as follows: 
(1) MATCH (node1)-[:KNOWS]->(node2) 
(2) WHERE node1.name=decryptRND(encryptRND 
(encryptDET(’Tom’), ID(node1)),ID(node1))} 
(3) SET node2.age= decryptRND(node2.age,ID(node2)) 
(4) with node2 
(5) MATCH (node1:Person)-[:KNOWS]->(node2) 
(6) WHERE node2.age = decryptRND 
(encryptRND(encryptDET(’22’), ID(node2)),ID(node2)) 
(7) return decryptDET(node2.name), decryptDET(node2.age) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In step (1), we have a MATCH clause to determine the direction of the relationship 
 and its depth. In step (2), as all values are held in the RND layer, we need to decrypt 
the name property within the DET layer, in order to allow the equality checking. In 
step (3), we lower the encryption of the age property for nodes in the previous step. In 
step (4), by using WITH we can pass the previous result so that it becomes the starting 
criteria to the next part of the query. In step (5) we determine the direction of the 
relationship. In step (6) we implement the second condition. In step (7) we return the 
result in plain text format. 
 
5.3 Results 
Each query was run over all five databases and execution times (in milliseconds) for 
non-encrypted data and encrypted data was collected, as presented in Table 3. 
The queries Q1 and Q'1, to find orphan nodes, resulted in a similar result for both 
the non-encrypted and encrypted databases. Those nodes were iterated through, 
checking each node for the presence of edges. For the queries Q2 - Q5 the execution 
time was clearly faster, this was expected since the queries over non-encrypted 
databases do not require any encryption layer adjustment. 
 
Table 3. Query results using different graph database sizes (milliseconds). 
 
Database No. of Nodes No. of Relationships Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q'1 Q'2 Q'3 Q'4 Q'5 
DB1 10 9 1 2 2 4 3 1 5 6 9 7 
DB2 100 82 1 4 4 3 4 2 20 20 18 15 
DB3 500 410 4 2 2 2 4 4 36 32 35 34 
DB4 1000 820 4 2 2 2 4 4 63 61 58 55 
DB5 10000 8200 4 2 2 2 4 15 555 504 505 655 
 
From an overall perspective, the retrieval time for non-encrypted databases is 
small and roughly similar for all datasets. For the encrypted case, the execution time 
clearly grows with the size of the database but remains in a practically feasible range 
(under a second) for the largest considered dataset. 
 
6 Conclusion 
 
In this paper, we reported on the implementation and evaluation of traversal- aware 
encryption adjustment mechanism for querying encrypted data in graph databases. 
The method provides better security protection against server-side attacks while 
keeping good implement ability and reasonable performance of query execution. 
 
Security The considered case studies have shown the trade-off between simple and 
traversal-aware encryption adjustment policies. The simple policy requires less 
queries and updates to be followed, on the other hand, the traversal-aware policy 
provides better security, as it reveals less information to a possible server- side 
attacker. With the latter policy, as observed above not all age property values were 
adjusted to the DET layer, just those required to allow the query execution to progress. 
 
Performance We report on experiments and performance of the proposed schema in 
the Appendix. To evaluate the proposed mechanism a collection of five databases was 
created, the proposed approach was tested using five types of Cypher queries. The 
evaluation was conducted by doing experiments that measure the execution time for a 
set of queries directed at both non-encrypted data and encrypted data with different 
dataset sizes. Our results are encouraging, but still, need to be validated using larger 
data sets. 
 
 
Implementability Similar to the methods in [2, 3, 9] and unlike the methods in [6, 
13] the proposed mechanism does not need to change the inner structure of the DBMS 
 
 
because it is implemented as a set of layers above the DBMS. In particular, the 
proposed approach is compatible with a concurrency control for multi-user DBMS, 
but related security aspects and performance evaluation in multi-user environment 
need to be addressed in future work.   
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